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Non-parametric tolerance limits are employed to calculate soft margins such as advocated in 
Williamson’s target zone proposal. In particular, the tradeoff between softness and zone width is 
quantified. This may be helpful in choosing appropriate margins. Furthermore, it offers 
policymakers a framework for reference in the case of changing exchange rate policy. The 
empirical applications include an evaluation of the EMS zone width. We also show that the 
procedures for calculating the soft margins are robust against alternative data-generating 
mechanisms. 
1. Introduction 
In eliminating exchange rate misalignments a burden is placed upon the 
intervening country. Not only do these interventions exhaust the country’s 
official reserves, but also subordinate domestic policy to achieving external 
balance. Therefore, with a managed float, a need exists to limit official 
intervention. For this reason Williamson (1985) proposes to set soft margins 
within which the real exchange rates are allowed to fluctuate. Unlike the 
rigid limits employed by, for example, the EMS, the soft margins occasio- 
nally may be exceeded. This can be a desirable property if governments are 
unable to precommit themselves to defending these margins at every price. 
Another argument in favor of soft rather than rigid margins is that it takes 
the wind out of the sails of speculators. That is, in taking positions 
speculators have to weigh the potential gain from a discrete realignment 
against the probability that authorities do not allow the exchange rate to 
move outside the zone and readjust the central rate smoothly.’ 
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‘For a speculator to be willing to take a bet the odds ratio on a discrete realignment must 
exceed the inverse excess returns that accrues if a discrete realignment occurs [see, for example, 
Sargent (1987, ch. 7)]. A similar argument applies to Williamson’s (1985, p. 65) example; see also 
Artis and Taylor (1990) and the formal arguments by Miller and Weller (1989) and Bertola and 
Caballero (1992). Krugman and Rotemberg (1992) discuss the relation between target zones and 
speculative attacks. 
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There are several examples of currently existing soft margins. The diver- 
gence indicators that are employed by the EMS to signal a possible 
misalignment are, in effect, soft margins. When a rate crosses the so-called 
threshold of divergence, precautionary action can be undertaken but is not 
compulsory.2 Examples of soft margins can be found in other areas as well. 
Several stock exchanges and commodity boards employ trading limits which 
are invoked at the discretion of the floor’s management [see, for example, 
Roll (1988)]. 
As it turns out, the determination of (soft) margins has received little 
attention in the literature. In the area of exchange rates the 2.25 percent 
margin currently employed by the EMS members is based upon the 2 
percent rule of thumb that was originally proposed by Keynes with regard to 
the gold points and which was subsequently employed under the Bretton 
Woods arrangement. Williamson (1985) employs a large-scale macro- 
economic model to calculate central rates and gauges that these calculations 
have a margin of error up to 10 percent. Given this uncertainty Williamson 
proposes the soft margins to be of the same magnitude, i.e. be as wide as 10 
percent. Recently, Krugman and Rotemberg (1992) and Bertola and Cabal- 
lero (1992) have solved explicitly for the exchange rate behavior in a partially 
credible band. 
This solution can be used in principle to calculate the size of the band 
given a set of policy variables and restrictions. But again it presupposes quite 
detailed (econometric) knowledge about the working of the fundamentals. 
The aim of this paper is to investigate the uses of an alternative way of fixing 
soft margins based on the simple non-parametric method of tolerance limits. 
This approach has certain advantages over the others. 
The statistical theory on tolerance limits generates intervals that contain 
with probability (1 - CX) at least a certain percentage rc of the population. This 
directly operationalizes the idea behind soft margins since a percentage 
(1 -n) of the exchange rate realizations is allowed to be outside the soft 
margins. An advantage of this approach is that the softness of the margins is 
made explicit. This allows one to quantify the tradeoff that exists between the 
softness in terms of percentage exceedances and the zone width. 
In estimating the margins that are consistent with the prevailing macro 
monetary policy regime, tolerance limits share the disadvantage with the 
macro approach, relied on by Williamson, that historical data must be used. 
Therefore the effects of new policy cannot be gauged in advance. As will 
become clear, however, the method is simple enough, such that it can be 
quickly applied to infer whether the desired margins and softness are 
compatible given a new set of policy actions. That is, from a limited sample 
‘These indicators are computed as follows: 0.75(1 -w) * 0.0225 * ECU rate, where w is the 
share of the currency in the ECU and 0.0225 is the fluctuation margin; this margin was 0.06 in 
the case of the lira, and was lowered to 0.0225 in January 1990. 
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of n exchange rates and given the desired (~1, rr) configuration, the soft 
margins which are consistent with the policy undertaken are readily esti- 
mated. In section 3 this procedure is illustrated on the basis of the first 46 
daily observations after the regime change of the Italian lira in January 1990. 
At this time the fluctuation margins of the lira were reduced to 2.25 percent. 
In case these new margins do not match the desired zone width, policy can 
be quickly readjusted. The large-scale macro approach is less well suited for 
such rapid feedback. To circumvent any misunderstanding, it is worth 
emphasizing that the method advanced in this paper does not generate 
policy-independent (a, rc) configurations. But the gain is that new (a,n) 
combinations can be established relatively easily and rapidly after the 
introduction of a new exchange rate policy. A final advantage of employing 
tolerance limits is that certain questions, such as determining the sample size 
n, can be answered independently from the specific data-generating mecha- 
nism. This is a desirable property, given the endemic difficulties associated 
with modelling exchange rates; cf. Mussa (1979) and Meese and Rogoff 
(1983). 
In the next section we briefly review the statistical theory of tolerance 
limits. On the basis of this theory we formulate a set of economic questions 
for which tolerance limits may be usefully employed. Section 3 contains the 
empirical counterpart of the theoretical section, which evaluates Williamson’s 
proposal for stabilizing real rates and also focuses on the nominal rate 
arrangement of the EMS. 
2. Statistical theory and economic issues 
We start by reviewing the theory on tolerance intervals. Consider a 
random sample of independent random variables Xi,. . . ,X, from a common 
continuous distribution F( .) with density f( .).3 Define two distribution free 
statistics L and H called tolerance limits, such that the tolerance interval 
(L, H) contains with probability (1 -c() at least a percentage z of the total 
population (tolerance limits should not be confused with confidence inter- 
vals). Formally, we seek statistics L and H such that 
where the distribution of F(H)-F(L) does not depend on F( .). As it turns 
out, the latter requirement is satisfied if and only if L and H are chosen to be 
order statistics [see David (1981, ch. 2.6)]. Letting X~l,~...~X~m,~.~.~ 
3The issue of dependent variates is discussed at the close of this section. 
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X,,, 5. .. SX,,, be the ascending order statistics, then there are values (m, s) 
such that4 
Prob {F(X,,) - F(X,,,) 2 rc} 2 1 -CL (2) 
In order to define one-sided tolerance limits the following convention is used: 
Xc,,,=,-,)= -co, and XtsEn+i)=a. Also, it is sometimes more convenient to 
use the index r, which is implicitly defined through n + 1 -r = s, instead of the 
index s. 
The non-parametric aspect of tolerance limits becomes evident from the 
following question. Given prescribed values for (m,s) and (c(,rc), how large a 
sample n must be taken to ascertain the inequalities in eq. (2)? Because 
F(Xe,) and F(X,,,) are just the order statistics corresponding to a uniform 
distribution, it is straightforward to show that CI equals the incomplete beta 
function [see, for example, David (1981)]. Upon inversion the sample size n 
can then be calculated. The following formula provides a good approxima- 
tion [see, for example, Conover (1980, p. 118)]: 
where xc1 _.,(2m+ 2r) is the (1 -cc)th quantile from a chi-square random 
variable with 2m+2r degrees of freedom. Note that the size of the sample is 
determined independently of the specific distribution F( .) from which the 
data are generated. The value of the tolerance limits, though, still depends on 
the type of F( .) that applies. 
An operational definition of softness and zone width is now easily given. 
On the basis of a sample of size n, the zone width is defined as the length of 
the tolerance interval (Xc,,,), X,,,) that contains with probability (1 -a) or 
higher at least a percentage rc of the total population. The softness of the 
zone consists in the percentage (1-7~) of the realizations that are allowed 
outside the zone. With these definitions and results in hand we can address 
several economic issues. 
Suppose a central bank has the objective to keep exchange rates or 
exchange rate returns within bounds. Given a policy prescribed (~1, rc) 
configuration, how large a sample should be taken to ascertain the feasibility 
of the objective? The answer can be found by applying formula (3). For 
example, let (tl, 7~) =(0.05,0.90), with m= r= 1 (i.e. s = n). This gives n =46. 
40rder statistics are defined as follows [see, for example, Conover (1980, p. 67)]. Let the 
variates from the random sample X,, .,X, be arranged in order of increasing magnitudes such 
that after relabeling, X,,,z 5 X0, 5 ‘. 5 X,,,, and we say that X,,, is the kth ascending order 
statistic. 
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Note that the sample size is independent from the specific F( .) that applies. 
Hence, with a change in the conduct of monetary policy like official 
intervention, a relatively short sample under the new policy rule already 
generates feasible soft margins; see section 3. The upper and lower bounds of 
the soft margins are identified with X(m)=X(l) and XcsJ =X,,,, respectively. 
The soft margins themselves, however, do depend on the specific F( .) and 
therefore on the policy rule which is in operation. Little is known about the 
link between exchange rates and monetary policy. This stems from two 
characteristics of the foreign exchange rate markets. Exchange rates are 
typically speculative prices which exhibit the unit root phenomenon [cf. 
Mussa (1979)], such that structural models do not contribute much in 
explaining their behavior [cf. Meese and Rogoff (1983)]. Central Banks, 
moreover, do not publicly announce their reaction functions which deter- 
mine, for example, the amount of official intervention.’ It follows that the 
connection between monetary policy and the distribution function F( .) is 
merely a black box. For this reason it is important that credible margins can 
be determined relatively easily in a robust manner. Upon the presumption of 
a stable policy, we will investigate the size of the soft margins for two 
stabilization programs. This will be done in terms of the tradeoff between the 
softness and the size of the target zone. The two regimes constitute a 
fictitious program for real rates in the spirit of Williamson’s proposal, and 
the evaluation of the divergence indicators in the EMS. 
Under Williamson’s target zone plan real rates are kept within soft 
margins while allowing for frequent adjustments of the central rates. 
Williamson goes as far as to suggest weekly realignments; we consider 
monthly adjustments. This is accomplished by investigating monthly real rate 
return data for currencies that have been more or less on a free float against 
each other. For a given sample size n and probability level cl=O.O5, different 
zone sizes are listed against the measure of softness (1 - rc). 
Given the policy pursued by the EMS countries, their bilateral nominal 
rates have been kept within the so-called fluctuation margins, while the 
occasional exceedances gave rise to a realignment of the central rates. Hence 
the nominal rates in deviation from the central rates are bounded statistics.6 
These are used to evaluate the so-called divergence indicators. These 
‘This lack of precise knowledge notwithstanding, we do know something about the differences 
in exchange rate behavior under alternative exchange rate regimes. For example, Krugman and 
Rotemberg (1992) show that under a target zone arrangement the expectation that authorities 
will defend the band exerts a stabilizing effect, even when the authorities are not actively 
intervening; cf. footnote 1. The exchange rate movements within the band become S-shaped. 
Unfortunately, however, Meese and Rose (1990) and Flood, Rose and Mathieson (1991) are 
unable to detect this S-effect empirically. 
60n the basis of Dickey-Fuller tests non-stationarity was rejected for most exchange rates in 
deviation from their central rates at the 5 percent significance level. Non-stationarity, however, 
could not be rejected for the unadjusted rates, as anticipated. 
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indicators constitute an inner multilateral margin, in contrast to the bilater- 
ally defined fluctuation margins, and are supposed to function as an early 
warning system; see footnote 2 for a formal definition. ‘The crossing of a 
divergence threshold entails the presumption, but not the obligation of 
corrective action by the authorities concerned’ [Korteweg (1980, p. 30)]. 
These divergence indicators can therefore be interpreted as soft margins, and 
we quantify the amount of softness exhibited by the current system. On the 
one hand it appears that the divergence indicator has played only a limited 
role, mainly because the indicator’s unfortunate multilateral definition signals 
the bilateral divergences in a distorted way [see, for example, Giavazzi and 
Giovannini (1989, p. 35)]. On the other hand, Giavazzi and Giovannini 
(1989, p. 65) show that intramarginal intervention represents a significant 
fraction of total intervention activities. Ungerer et al. (1986, p. 5) argue that 
early action in terms of intramarginal intervention lends credibility to the 
policy of trying to keep the exchange rates within the band, while allowing 
the exchange rate movements to gain momentum and resorting to marginal 
intervention alone tends to be destabilizing. Therefore we also consider a 
fictitious bilateral divergence indicator, in line with the bilateral nature of the 
fluctuation margins, which may have functioned as the de facto early 
warning system. 
As outlined above, the size of the zone depends on F( .) and thereby upon 
the policy pursued. To investigate this dependency two different periods are 
considered for which it is known that the monetary authorities pursued 
different objectives, i.e. a different monetary policy for Germany. For each of 
these periods the above exercises are repeated and compared. In addition, the 
effect of the reduction in the fluctuation margin of the lira is studied 
separately. 
Before turning to the empirical applications, we briefly address how 
dependency in the data affects the computation of the tolerance limits. 
Typically, exchange rate returns may exhibit some autocorrelation in the first 
moment, but the second moment is definitely autocorrelated, producing the 
typical periods of quiescence and turbulence [see, for example, Bollerslev 
(1990)]. While these types of dependencies still allow for consistent estima- 
tion of the tolerance limit, the small sample estimates can be less efficient.’ 
To investigate these matters we conducted several Monte Carlo experiments. 
As will become evident from the next section, the computation of tolerance 
limits does not seem to suffer much from the type of dependency usually 
encountered in exchange rate data. 
‘Consistency of formula (2) for the i.i.d. case follows directly from the Glivenko-Cantelli 
theorem, which states that the empirical distribution converges in probability uniformly to the 
true distribution. This result carries over to dependent variates if (Xi} is a strictly stationary 
stochastic process, e.g. an ARCH process [see Tucker (1959)]. 
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3. Applications 
In this section we evaluate the tradeoff between the zone width and the 
softness for Williamson’s target zone proposal and for the EMS thresholds of 
divergence. To this end, two different data sets are needed: one with real 
rates for the Williamson proposal, and one with nominal rates for the EMS. 
For the first application we constructed monthly real exchange rates for the 
British pound (BP), Dutch guilder (DG), Italian lira (IL) and Deutsche mark 
(DM) quoted against the United States dollar (US) over the period January 
1973 to October 1987. The real rates are derived from the end-of-month spot 
rates and the respective wholesale price indices, all reported in the Internatio- 
nal Financial Statistics published by the International Monetary Fund. The 
real rates are computed as in McKinnon (1979, eq. 6.12). The real rates are 
then converted to monthly returns by taking logarithmic first differences. For 
the EMS application we used weekly Friday closing quotations of the 
Belgian franc (BF), French franc (FF), Danish krone (DK), Irish pound (IP), 
and the IL, DG and DM quoted against the US from the Harris bank. 
These quotations were then used to compute crossrates against the DM and 
the ECU. The sample covers the period 13 March 1979, i.e. the inception 
date of the EMS, to 6 February 1987.’ These nominal rates are then 
converted to relative deviations from the respective central rates. The 
thresholds are computed from the currency weights and parities against the 
ECU as reported in the EC bulletin. Finally, some daily data were collected 
to investigate the reduction in the fluctuation margin of the lira. 
For the target zone proposal soft margins have to be established within 
which real rates fluctuate, while sometimes being allowed to move outside 
the band. One approach is to calculate bands on the basis of a macro model, 
cf. Williamson. This approach has the drawback of the presumed applicabi- 
lity of the structural equations and it does not easily make the softness 
explicit. The method of tolerance limits, on the other hand, does not rely on 
any structural relationship, but operationalizes the softness that is associated 
with the zone width. Table 1 provides the tradeoff between zone width and 
softness.’ The zone width is the difference, X,,,-X,,,, and the softness 
follows from eq. (3) upon inversion so that l--71 becomes explicit. The table 
provides the following information. For example, for a sample size n=75 the 
difference between the 71st largest and 5th largest observation of the IL/US 
rate generates a zone width of Xc,,,- Xc5)= 10.3 and associated softness of 
1 -n=0.200. To provide a yardstick for judging the zone width, the standard 
8All data are available from the first author upon request. 
9Calculations are based on data from a regime without a target zone. As explained before, the 
introduction of a target zone may affect F( .), cf. footnote 5, and thus the estimates in table 1 
may not be entirely applicable to a particular target zone. However, the method of tolerance 
limits is especially designed to quickly generate updated estimates once a new (a,~) configu- 
ration is chosen; see the example case of the lira which is discussed below. 
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Table 1 
The target zone proposal.” 
Sample 
size r=m 
Zone width 
Softness 
l--x BP/US DG/US IL/US DM/US 
N=25 1 
2 
5 
10 
N=50 1 
2 
5 
10 
N=75 1 
2 
5 
10 
N=lOO 1 
2 
5 
10 
N=125 1 
2 
5 
10 
N=150 1 
t 
10 
N=175 1 
2 
5 
10 
Standard 
deviation 
0.176 
0.282 
0.553 
0.947 
0.091 
0.147 
0.294 
0.512 
0.061 
0.100 
o.200 
0.350 
0.046 
0.075 
0.151 
0.266 
0.037 
0.122 
0.215 
0.03 1 
0.050 
0.102 
0.180 
0.026 
0.043 
0.088 
0.155 
9.0 19.7 
6.2 11.2 
4.1 5.7 
0.9 1.4 
12.1 21.6 
8.7 14.9 
6.3 8.0 
4.6 4.5 
13.6 23.5 
2.1 21.2 
9.0 11.5 
6.2 7.2 
17.2 23.9 
13.‘7 23.2 
10.8 13.9 
8.7 9.0 
17.2 23.9 
13.9 23.2 
11.9 13.9 
10.2 9.3 
23.8 23.9 
17.7 23.2 
12.4 12.3 
10.8 10.5 
23.8 23.9 
17.7 23.2 
12.4 15.6 
10.8 11.6 
3.356 3.720 3.222 3.747 
13.4 
10.8 
5.4 
2.4 
17.9 
13.1 
9.0 
4.3 
17.9 
13.9 
10.3 
5.0 
19.8 24.1 
16.5 22.6 
11.8 13.1 
7.6 8.8 
19.8 24.1 
16.5 22.6 
11.9 13.1 
8.3 9.2 
19.8 
16.5 
12.4 
9.4 
19.8 
17.1 
13.1 
10.8 
24.1 
22.6 
14.9 
10.0 
24.1 
22.6 
14.9 
11.5 
18.1 
16.1 
6.8 
1.8 
22.0 
18.6 
8.0 
5.6 
22.6 
22.0 
9.6 
6.7 
“The a level is 0.05. The m and r refer to the two order statistics which tix the 
tolerance limits. The zone widths and standard deviations are resealed by a factor 
of 100 to turn these into percentages. The underlined figures are discussed in the 
text. 
deviation of the real return is reported at the bottom of the table (the mean 
was never significantly different from zero). The softness and the zone width 
are inversely related, as expected. This inverse relationship, however, is not 
the same for all currencies. For example, both the BP/US and the DG/US 
rates have approximately the same zone for 1 -n=O.512 and n= 50, but the 
DG/US rate requires a much wider zone for 1 - rc =0.091. It also appears 
from the table that there is a tendency for those currencies that are closely 
kept in line with each other, i.e. the DG and DM, to require much larger 
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(a) EMS definition 
Table 2 
Frequency of threshold exceedances.” 
Number 
of weeks 
Exceedances of EMS threshold 
BF FF IL DG DM DK IP 
413 175 124 31 132 226 137 104 
(42.4) (30.3) (7.5) (32.0) (54.7) (33.2) (25.2) 
(b) Alternative definition 
BF 
FF 
IL 
DG 
DM 
DK 
IP 
BF FF IL DG DM DK IP 
_ 155 128 120 107 
(37.5) (;1:.4) (31.0) (29.1) (25.9) $.l) 
149 _ 
(i.7) $7) 
100 
$2) 
36 
(36.1) (24.2) (8.7) 
40 _ 22 26 
(9.7) (i.7) (5.3) (6.3) (i.2) (f0) 
124 23 _ 24 
(30.0) (& (5.6) (5.8) (Z.7) (Z.4) 
117 
(28.3) (ZZ.0, 
27 25 
(6.5) (6.1) (E.3, $7) 
102 
(24.7) $7) 
18 31 
(4.4) (zz.7) $6) _ (7.5) 
(& 
37 
(9.0) (4.0) (:;.6) (Zi.2) 
31 _ 
(7.5) 
“Exceedances of the 75 percent times 2.25 percent margins (6 percent for IL) of EMS exchange 
rates multilaterally (a) and bilaterally (b) between 13 March 1979 and 6 February 1987 (reported 
are the number of exceedances with the percentages in parentheses). 
zone widths against the dollar for small 1 -rc vis-a-vis currencies that have a 
bad EMS reputation. Apparently, intra EMS stability is traded off against 
the stability of a currency against the dollar. This may, however, be an 
artifact due to small samples; cf. the lower part of the table. But note that 
estimates are relatively stable at different sample sizes. For example, the 
configuration n= 100 and 1 -x=0.046 gives about the same zone widths as 
n= 175 and 1 -x=0.043. In general, the zones required for low softness are 
quite high, i.e. of the order of magnitude of 20 percent as proposed by 
Williamson. A more modest softness of 10 percent reduces the required zone 
width to about 10 percent. 
Within the EMS the exceedance of the divergence indicator by one of the 
currencies signals a possible upcoming exchange crisis which may be 
prevented by early action. The problem is, though, that the definition of an 
exchange rate crisis is in terms of the bilateral exchange rates, while the 
divergence indicators are in terms of the ECU. Thus, as has been noted in 
the literature, the alarm may not be in time, or false. Therefore we have 
computed the empirical frequency of exceedances of the 75 percent threshold 
by EMS currencies in two ways: see table 2. The upper panel accords with 
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the definition of the threshold employed by the EMS, the lower panel is in 
terms of bilateral currencies and is consistent with the definition of a crisis. 
Note that the lower panel is not completely symmetric due to Jensen’s 
inequality. Roughly speaking, for all currencies on average once every month 
there is a week with a crossing of the divergence indicator. The exception is 
the IL due to its wider margins. From the lower panel it becomes clear that 
the DG and DM are a separate bloc in the EMS with relatively few 
crossings in terms of each other. This is not surprising given the policy 
pursued by the Dutch central bank. 
In table 3 we have computed the tradeoff between the zone width implied 
by a divergence threshold and the softness for the EMS currencies. The 
computations for and the interpretations of the table are analogous to those 
of table 1. Note that the level of the threshold is inversely related to the 
timeliness of the warning. Thus, an alternative interpretation of table 3 is in 
terms of timeliness and softness. The underlined figures in part (a) corres- 
pond most closely to the current EMS defined threshold level, cf. footnote 2, 
and correspond to the alternative threshold level in part (b). In the latter 
case these are 9.00 for the IL, and 3.375 for the other currencies, respectively. 
In the former case these thresholds vary with the variation in the weights. 
Note that the softness associated with the actual EMS thresholds in table 3, 
part (a), corresponds very closely with the empirical frequencies reported in 
table 2, part (a). Table 3 offers policymakers the opportunity to gauge the 
effects of widening or narrowing these thresholds in terms of softness for the 
EMS arrangement. 
As expected on the basis of table 3, for most currencies in part (a), the 
softness associated with the thresholds that are currently in operation is quite 
high, i.e. of the order of 35 percent. Exceptions are the IL and DM. The 
former is much lower owing to the wider margins for the lira, while the high 
softness of the mark can be explained by the fact that it is the nth and often 
strongest currency in the ECU basket. Therefore, if any other currency is 
low, then the DM is most likely carrying the reverse burden of being high. 
Thus, while it is not always the same currency that is low, the mark is 
usually the highest. In part (b) the alternative definition of the threshold of 
divergence is used for some selected currencies. The same zone width as in 
part (a) is now associated with a much lower softness. This is not too 
surprising given the fact that the alternative definition is in terms of bilateral 
exchange rates. A multilateral divergence occurs more frequently than a 
divergence for a given bilateral rate. In comparison with part (b), the part (a) 
also shows that somewhat higher multilateral thresholds, say a doubling of 
the zone width, would reduce the necessary softness dramatically. This 
indicates that the recurrent realignments during the first years of the EMS 
may have been a very high price for the narrow zone. Somewhat wider 
margins could potentially have reduced the pressure. 
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Table 3 
Fixing thresholds of divergence.” 
(a) EMS definition 
13.3.1979-5.1.1987 
Period: (n=409 weeks) 
13.3.1979-10.7.1981 
(n = 122 weeks) 
r=m l-n Zone 
21.3.1983-15.7.1985 
(n = 122 weeks) 
Currency r=m 1-n 
BF 
FF 
IL 
DG 
DM 
DK 
IP 
1 0.011 
10 0.066 
15 0.095 
25 0.150 
50 0.280 
“!g 
100 
1 0.011 
10 0.066 
15 0.095 
25 0.150 
50 0.280 
690.376 
100 0.531 
1 0.011 11.22 
10 0.066 9.50 
15 0.095 8.36 
16 0.101 8.19 
25 0.150 7.47 
50 0.280 5.00 
1 0.011 7.54 
10 0.066 6.21 
15 0.095 5.46 
25 0.150 4.43 
50 0.280 3.58 
66 0.361 3.02 
75 0.407 2.67 
100 0.531 1.89 
1 0.011 
10 0.066 
15 0.095 
25 0.150 
50 0.280 
75 0.407 
9.61 
7.46 
6.25 
5.23 
4.12 
3.28 
2.20 
1.72 
105 0.556 
125 0.654 
1 0.011 
10 0.066 
15 0.095 
50 0.280 
63 0.346 
75 0.407 
1 0.011 
10 0.066 
15 0.095 
25 0.150 
49 0.275 
50 0.280 
75 0.407 
Zone 
7.78 
6.19 
5.28 
4.62 
3.65 
3.07 
2.40 
7.11 
5.63 
5.03 
4.39 
3.43 
2.75 
1.94 
9.01 
5.86 
5.48 
3.87 
3.30 
2.96 
7.98 
6.09 
5.26 
4.40 
3.36 
3.32 
2.70 
1 0.038 
10 0.220 
12 0.257 
15 0.311 
25 0.483 
1 0.038 
9 0.202 
10 0.220 
15 0.311 
1 0.038 8.90 
6 0.145 8.17 
10 0.220 7.05 
15 0.311 6.32 
1 0.038 
4 
10 
0.105 
0.220 
15 0.311 
1 0.038 
10 0.220 
15 0.311 
24 0.467 
30 0.566 
1 0.038 
10 0.220 
15 0.311 
16 0.328 
25 0.483 
1 0.038 6.22 1 0.038 5.69 
10 0.220 3.84 10 0.220 3.66 
11 0.239 3.35 16 0.328 3.29 
15 0.311 2.60 20 0.398 3.06 
4.80 1 0.038 5.11 
3.42 10 0.220 4.04 
2.92 15 0.311 3.82 
2.55 25 0.483 3.08 
1.44 30 0.566 2.64 
3.83 
2.65 
2.55 
2.17 
1 0.038 
8 
10 
0.183 
0.220 
15 0.311 
6.03 
2.77 
2.59 
2.32 
1 0.038 
2 
10 
0.062 
0.220 
15 0.311 
10.00 
7.15 
4.93 
4.46 
3.34 1 0.038 3.42 
3.02 4 0.105 3.07 
2.45 10 0.220 2.54 
2.12 15 0.311 2.35 
5.93 1 0.038 4.12 
3.87 10 0.220 3.40 
3.33 15 0.311 3.02 
2.24 28 0.534 2.26 
1.93 30 0.566 2.11 
5.86 1 0.038 5.65 
3.89 10 0.220 4.24 
3.41 15 0.311 3.92 
3.25 22 0.432 3.29 
2.40 25 0.483 3.16 
r=m l-n Zone 
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Table 3-Continued 
(b) Alternative definition (selected currencies) 
Period: 
Currency 
DG/DM 
DG/BF 
DG/FF 
DMjIL 
FF/DM 
FF/IL 
13.3.1979%5.1.1987 
(n=409 weeks) 
r=m l-n 
1 0.011 
5 0.038 
6 0.044 
Zone 
5.06 
3.52 
3.45 
10 0.066 3.28 
15 0.095 3.02 
1 0.011 4.27 
5 0.038 3.38 
10 0.066 3.03 
15 0.095 2.76 
1 0.011 8.26 
10 0.066 3.95 
15 0.095 3.63 
23 0.139 3.37 
25 0.150 3.27 
1 0.011 12.26 
5 0.038 9.12 
6 0.044 8.99 
10 0.066 8.63 
1 0.011 9.13 
10 0.066 4.36 
25 0.150 3.93 
34 0.197 3.36 
1 0.011 10.33 
2 0.026 8.52 
10 0.066 7.30 
15 0.095 6.97 
13.3.1979-10.7.1981 
(n= 122 weeks) 
r=m l-n Zone 
1 0.038 
5 0.125 
8 
10 
0.183 
0.220 
15 0.311 
1 0.038 
10 0.220 
15 0.311 
1 0.038 
2 0.062 
10 0.220 
15 0.311 
4.2 1 1 0.038 
3.51 5 0.125 
3.36 8 
3.27 10 
2.98 15 
2.67 I 
1.80 
1.65 
3.12 
2.88 
1.37 
1.10 
1 
z 
0.038 
0.062 
9.53 
6.81 
10 0.220 
1 0.038 
5 0.125 
9 
10 
0.202 
0.220 
4.70 
4.91 
3.97 
3.31 
2.99 
1 
5 
0.038 
0.062 
9.56 
7.25 
10 0.220 6.52 
15 0.311 6.18 
21.3.1983-15.7.1985 
(n = 122 weeks) 
r=m l-71 
10 
15 
1 
2 
10 
15 
1 
2 _ 
10 
1 
2 
5 
10 
1 
2 _ 
10 
15 
0.183 1.17 
0.220 1.07 
0.311 0.86 
o.038 3.01 
0.220 2.33 
0.311 2.13 
0.038 4.58 
0.062 2.76 
0.220 2.03 
0.311 1.59 
0.038 11.68 
0.062 8.91 
0.220 7.44 
0.038 6.36 
0.062 3.47 
0.125 2.78 
0.220 2.43 
0.038 10.33 
0.062 7.85 
0.220 5.90 
0.311 5.42 
Zone 
2.45 
1.27 
“The c( level is 0.05, and the zone widths again are resealed by a factor of 100. The 
interpretation of the table is analogous to that of table 1. 
Columns 2 and 3 in both parts of table 3 show the results for two 
subperiods of equal length. These periods were characterized by respectively 
a contractionary and expansionary monetary policy in Germany [see 
Ungerer et al. (1986)]. Therefore, a comparison between the two subperiods, 
and a comparison with the results for the entire period, indicate the stability 
of the results. Potentially, different policy regimes generate different zone 
width and softness combinations. From the parts (a) and (b) it appears that 
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Table 4 
Fixing thresholds of divergence after policy 
change.” 
(a) EMS definition 
Zone width 
Daily 
(1990) 
Weekly 
(1979-1980) 
BF 0.89 1.53 
FF 0.93 1.52 
IL 0.91 4.68 
DG 0.84 1.21 
DM 1.28 2.56 
(b) Alternative definition 
DG/DM 1.19 2.61 
DG/BF 1.13 2.19 
DG/FF 0.78 1.50 
DM/IL 1.70 3.70 
FF/DM 2.15 2.20 
FF/IL 2.25 4.67 
“Computations are based on daily rates 
over the period (15.01.90-20.03.90) and 
weekly rates over the period (30.11.79- 
11.10.80). The following parameter values 
were used: n = 46, r=m= 1, a=0.05 and 
1 -n=O.lO. 
the two subperiods are very similar, and have zone-softness combinations 
that are of the same order of magnitude as for the entire period. There are 
two exceptions to the similarity in subperiods: the DG/DM and FF/DM 
rates had much lower softness during the second subperiod. Most likely this 
stems from the loosening of monetary policy (i.e. a loosening of the credit 
market) during the second period in Germany. 
An interesting regime switch occurred on 8 January 1990 when the 
fluctuation margins of the lira were reduced from 6 to 2.25 percent. We 
investigate this policy change for two reasons. First, the regime switch was 
much more apparent to the public than the other two considered above. 
Secondly, it provides a nice opportunity to demonstrate the rapid feedback 
generated by the tolerance limits. To this end we collected 46 daily rates 
from the Wall Street Journal for the period 15 January to 20 March 1990. 
Over this period the lira was outside the EMS threshold of divergence for 17 
percent of the time. Table 4 reports the zone widths that are associated with 
a softness l -~=0.10 and an a level of 0.05. All zones are smaller than the 
actual zone widths (recall that these are 3.375 for the alternative definition). 
It appears that the chosen softness is compatible with the zone widths. The 
margins might even be somewhat reduced. To provide material for compari- 
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Table 5 
Effects of dependency.” 
Independent AR(l) GARCH(l,l) 
1 - K (mean) 0.073 0.077 0.081 
I -n (max) 0.127 0.123 0.140 
1 - 71 (min) 0.037 0.042 0.030 
1 -K (s.d.) 0.014 0.014 0.018 
Zone (mean) 3.544 3.563 3.513 
Zone (max) 4.124 4.087 4.417 
Zone (min) 3.006 3.081 2.936 
Zone (s.d.) 0.155 0.170 0.219 
z 2.100 5.400 14.900 
“The following AR( 1) scheme was used in generating depen- 
dent data: X,=0.1X,_, +e,, where the e, are independent 
standard normally distributed. The GARCH( 1,1) process used 
was: X,=e,v,, u: =0.03+0.02x~_ 1 +0.95& ,, where again the 
e, are i.i.d. standard normal. 
son, we also computed the zone width using the weekly data over the period 
November 1979 to October 1980. This period was the first period containing 
at least 46 consecutive weeks without a realignment. The more recent daily 
zone widths reveal the convergence which has been achieved by the EMS. 
To further investigate the robustness of our results, we studied the effects 
of serial dependency. The Box-Ljung test statistic indicates some autocorre- 
lation in the first moment of most currency returns, but autocorrelation 
coefficients were always smaller than 0.1. ARCH effects, however, indicating 
serial dependency in the second moment, were strongly present in the weekly 
series. Evidence on this effect is well reported in the literature [see, for 
example, Bollerslev (1990)], and is not repeated here to save space. In order 
to investigate the effects of these types of autocorrelation on our procedures 
we conducted some Monte Carlo experiments. In table 5 an independently 
normally distributed dataset is compared with two explicitly dependent 
datasets. We consider two stochastic processes: AR(l) with autoregressive 
parameter 0.1, and GARCH(l, 1) with standard normal innovations and 
volatility function t$ = a + bxF_ 1 + dvf_ 1, where x, are the realizations and v, 
are the conditional variances, and parameter values a = 0.03, b = 0.02, d = 0.95 
[these values are similar to those that are reported by, for example, 
Bollerslev (1990)]. The parameters are chosen such that unconditional 
variances of the i.i.d. series, the AR(l) and the GARCH(l, 1) process, are of 
comparable magnitudes. From a 1,000 times repeated drawing of a random 
sample of size n =409, the mean, minimum, maximum and standard devi- 
ation values for softness and zone width were computed. It appears from 
table 5 that dependency does not significantly influence the results. But the 
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precision is decreased, i.e. u increases, as was anticipated at the end of 
section 2. 
4. Conclusions 
The tolerance limit approach advocated in this paper offers an attractive 
framework to policymakers on two accounts. First, the tradeoff that exists 
between softness and zone width is quantified explicitly. To the best of our 
knowledge, this has not been investigated in the literature before. Second, 
even though the analysis relies on historical data, it is flexible enough to 
quickly check whether the desired margins and softness are in line with each 
other. Unlike extensive macro models, it provides the swiftness and robust- 
ness often sought for when testing for consistency in exchange rate policy. 
References 
Artis, M.J. and M.P. Taylor, 1990, International linancial stability and the regulation of capital 
flows, in: G. Bird, ed., The international financial regime (Surrey University Press, London) 
163-196. 
Bertola, G. and R.J. Caballero, 1992, Sustainable intervention policies and exchange rate 
dynamics, in: P. Krugman and M. Miller, eds., Exchange rate targets and currency bands 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) 186206. 
Bollerslev, T., 1990, Modeling the coherence in short-run nominal exchange rates: A multivariate 
generalized ARCH-model, The Review of Economics and Statistics 72, 4988505. 
Conover, W.J., 1980, Practical nonparametric statistics, 2nd edn. (Wiley, New York). 
David, H.A., 1981, Order statistics. 2nd edn. (Wilev, New York). 
Flood, R.P., A.K. Rose and D.J. Mathieson, 1961, An empirical exploration of exchange rate 
target-zones, NBER Working Paper 3543. 
Giavazzi, F. and A. Giovannini, 1989, Limiting exchange rate flexibility (MIT Press, Cambridge, 
MA). 
Korteweg, P., 1980, The European monetary system - will it really bring more monetary 
stability to Europe?, De Economist 128, 1549. 
Krugman, P. and J. Rotemberg, 1992, Speculative attacks on target zones, in: P. Krugman and 
M. Miller, eds., Exchange rate targets and currency bands (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge) 1777232. 
McKinnon, 1979, Money in international exchange (Oxford University Press, New York). 
Meese, R. and K. Rogoff, 1983, Empirical exchange rate models of the seventies: Do they lit out 
of sample?, Journal of International Economics 14, 3-24. 
Meese, R.A. and A.K. Rose, 1990, Nonlinear, nonparametric, nonessential exchange rate 
estimation, American Economic Review 80, 192-196. 
Miller, M. and P. Weller, 1989, Exchange rate bands and realignments in a stationary stochastic 
setting, in: M. Miller, B. Eichengreen and R. Portes, eds., Blueprints for exchange-rate 
management (Academic Press, London) 161-173. 
Mussa, M., 1979, Empirical regularities in the behavior of exchange rates and theories of the 
foreign exchange market, Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series & Public Policy, 9-57. 
Roll, R.. 1988, The international crash of October 1987, Financial Analvst Journal 44. no. 5. 
19-35. 
J.J.E.- H 
374 P. Kofman et al., Fixing soft margins 
Sargent, T.J., 1987, Macroeconomic theory, 2nd edn. (Academic Press, Boston, MA). 
Tucker, H.G., 1959, A generalization of the Glivenko-Cantelli theorem, Annals of Mathematical 
Statistics 30, 828-830. 
Ungerer, H., 0. Evans, T. Mayer and P. Young, 1986, The European monetary system: Recent 
developments, Occasional IMF Papers, no. 48. 
Williamson, J., 1985, The exchange rate system, 2nd edn. (Institute for International Economics, 
Washington, DC). 
